

UNCLEARED NOMINATIONS

Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, there are several nominations that had been cleared for some length of time on our side of the aisle, and I was disappointed we were not able to clear them on the other side. The Intelligence Committee reported the General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence on July 26, and that is being held up. We have the Assistant Secretary of Defense and an Under Secretary of Defense that we have been unable to reach consent on. I hope my colleagues on the other side of the aisle would allow these important defense and intelligence positions to go forward, and we will try again when we return.

AUTHORITY TO MAKE APPOINTMENTS

Mr. FRIST. I ask unanimous consent that notwithstanding the upcoming recess or adjournment of the Senate, the President of the Senate, the President pro tempore, and the majority and minority leaders be authorized to make appointments to commissions, committees, boards, conferences, or inter-parliamentary conferences authorized by law by concurrent action of the two Houses or by order of the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

SIGNING AUTHORITY

Mr. FRIST. I ask unanimous consent that during adjournment the Senate majority leader and junior Senator from Virginia be authorized to sign duly enrolled bills or joint resolutions.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER FOR NOMINATIONS TO REMAIN IN STATUS QUO

Mr. FRIST. As in executive session, I ask unanimous consent all nominations received by the Senate during the first session of the 109th Congress remain in status quo following the sine die adjournment of the first session under the provisions of rule XXXI, paragraph 6, of the Standing Rules of the Senate, with the following exception: Calendar No. 436, Brett Kavanaugh, PN203, and a list of nominations from the armed services that are at the desk.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection it is so ordered.

GLOBAL PATHOGEN SURVEILLANCE AND RESPONSE

Mr. FRIST. I ask unanimous consent the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of S. 2170, introduced earlier today.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the bill by title.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (S. 2170) to provide for global pathogen surveillance and response.

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.

Mr. FRIST. I ask unanimous consent the bill be read a third time and passed, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, and any statements related to the bill be printed in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The bill (S. 2170) was read the third time and passed, as follows:

S. 2170

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Global Pathogen Surveillance Act of 2005".

SEC. 2. FINDINGS; PURPOSE.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The frequency of the occurrence of biological events that could threaten the national security of the United States has increased and is likely increasing. The threat to the United States from such events includes threats from diseases that infect humans, animals, or plants regardless of if such diseases are introduced naturally, accidentally, or intentionally.

(2) The United States lacks an effective and real-time system to detect, identify, contain, and respond to global threats and also lacks an effective mechanism to disseminate information to the national response community if such threats arise.

(3) Bioterrorism poses a grave national security threat to the United States. The insidious nature of a bioterrorist attack, the likelihood that the recognition of such an attack would be delayed, and the under-preparedness of the domestic public health infrastructure to respond to such an attack could result in catastrophic consequences following a biological weapons attack against the United States.

(4) The ability to recognize that a country or organization is carrying out a covert biological weapons programs is dependent on a number of indications and warnings. A critical component of this recognition is the timely detection of sentinel events such as laboratory accidents and community-level outbreaks that could be the earliest indication of an emerging bioterrorist program in a foreign country. Early detection of such events may enable earlier counter-proliferation intervention.

(5) A contagious pathogen engineered as a biological weapon and developed, tested, produced, or released in a foreign country could quickly spread to the United States. Considering the realities of international travel, trade, and migration patterns, a dangerous pathogen appearing naturally, accidentally, or intentionally anywhere in the world can spread to the United States in a matter of days, before any effective quarantine or isolation measures could be implemented.

(6) To combat bioterrorism effectively and ensure that the United States is fully prepared to prevent, recognize, and contain a biological weapons attack, or emerging infectious disease, measures to strengthen the domestic public health infrastructure and improve domestic event detection, surveillance, and response, while absolutely essential, are not sufficient.

(7) The United States should enhance cooperation with the World Health Organization, regional international health organizations, and individual countries, including data sharing with appropriate agencies and departments of the United States, to help de-

tect and quickly contain infectious disease outbreaks or a bioterrorism agent before such a disease or agent is spread.

(8) The World Health Organization has done an impressive job in monitoring infectious disease outbreaks around the world, particularly with the establishment in April 2000 of the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network.

(9) The capabilities of the World Health Organization depend on the quality of the data and information the Organization receives from the countries that are members of the Organization and is further limited by the narrow list of diseases (such as plague, cholera, and yellow fever) on which such surveillance and monitoring is based and by the consensus process used by the Organization to add new diseases to the list. Developing countries, in particular, often are unable to devote the necessary resources to build and maintain public health infrastructures.

(10) In particular, developing countries could benefit from—

(A) better trained public health professionals and epidemiologists to recognize disease patterns;

(B) appropriate laboratory equipment for diagnosis of pathogens;

(C) disease reporting systems that—

(i) are based on disease and syndrome surveillance; and

(ii) could enable an effective response to a biological event to begin at the earliest possible opportunity;

(D) a narrowing of the existing technology gap in disease and syndrome surveillance capabilities, based on reported symptoms, and real-time information dissemination to public health officials; and

(E) appropriate communications equipment and information technology to efficiently transmit information and data within national, international regional, and international health networks, including inexpensive, Internet-based Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and relevant telephone-based systems for early recognition and diagnosis of diseases.

(11) An effective international capability to detect, monitor, and quickly diagnose infectious disease outbreaks will offer dividends not only in the event of biological weapons development, testing, production, and attack, but also in the more likely cases of naturally occurring infectious disease outbreaks that could threaten the United States. Furthermore, a robust surveillance system will serve to deter, prevent, or contain terrorist use of biological weapons, mitigating the intended effects of such malevolent uses.

(b) PURPOSES.—The purposes of this Act are as follows:

(1) To provide the United States with an effective and real-time system to detect biological threats that—

(A) utilizes classified and unclassified information to detect such threats; and

(B) may be utilized by the human or the agricultural domestic disease response community.

(2) To enhance the capability of the international community, through the World Health Organization and individual countries, to detect, identify, and contain infectious disease outbreaks, whether the cause of those outbreaks is intentional human action or natural in origin.

(3) To enhance the training of public health professionals and epidemiologists from eligible developing countries in advanced Internet-based disease and syndrome surveillance systems, in addition to traditional epidemiology methods, so that such professionals and epidemiologists may better detect, diagnose, and contain infectious disease outbreaks, especially such outbreaks